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Abstract 
This article models mergers as exchange options where acquirers 
offer stocks and/or cash to target firms in exchange of acquiring 
some shareholding in target firms. Mergers analysed in this 
article happen between homogeneous entities. The B-S and 
Margrabe models are used to price cash and stocks (including 
stocks and cash) deals respectively. The M&A traits are grouped 
as conflict of interest, market growth, funding and specialisation. 
Regression results illustrate that exchange options react to M&A 
characteristics differently. Thus, the results are beneficial to both 
sell-and buy-side investors in terms on how one manages merging 
firms. The goodness of fit suggests that strategic acquisitions 
played important roles. 
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1 Introduction 
Growth options are suitable to analyse strategic decisions as they capture the 
flexibility of firms in either allowing scaling down or increasing operations. 
Therefore, this flexibility is of paramount importance as it indirectly allows firms 
to hedge against possible emerging risks during the lives of firms. In other 
words, growth options especially exchange ones have multiple capabilities which 
go beyond assisting firms in strategic growth ventures. Those exchange options 
do not occur in isolated environment. That is, there are numerous economic 
variables or parameters that react in the presence of exchange options being 
exercised. That relationship-reaction of economic variables in the presence of 
exchange options is central to this article. Questions that might arise, do those 
economic variables increase or decrease value of exchange options, who benefits 
in that kind of environment, etc. Exchange options emerge specifically due to 
merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions. M&A deals are similar to new 
ventures. New ventures tend to offer a lot of opportunities for growth. According 
to Schulte (2018), new ventures offer practical insights into unique enterprises 
and and new-entrants to markets. On the other hand, M&A represents one of the 
most important phenomena where exchange options have been explored. Studies 
in this area argue that option pricing is able to capture the full value of target 
firms as flexibility would not be accounted for within other modelling set ups. 
After one of the earliest work applying a general option pricing model to M&A 
operations-Bhagat et al. (1987), other researchers adopted the same theoretical 
framework to study stocks financed deals in the real estate investment trust 
(REIT) industry-Sebehela (2008)-and cash financed M&As in non-real estate 
sectors-Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010). The value of new information, especially 
in option trading environment has been illustrated by He et al. (2010).  
 
This empirical study combines previous studies on growth of REITs and options, 
and it focuses on REITs as a laboratory to explore exchange options during REIT 
acquisitions. One believes that this industry represents a unique laboratory to 
explore the value of such options and its driving factors. The evolution of the 
REIT industry throughout the world, it is a unique one. U.S. REITs were created 
on 14 September 1960 when then President Eisenhower signed the REIT Act 
contained in the Cigar Exercise Tax Extension. On September the 15th 1960, 
NAREIT (National Association of REITs) was created. Initial the REITs debut 
happened during the mid-1960s, which saw new listing including Continental 
Mortgage Investors (first one to be listed in the New York Stock Exchange), 
Bradley Real Estate Investors, First Mortgage Investors, Winthrop Realty Trust, 
Pennsylvania REIT and Washington REIT. The first European country to pass 
REIT legislation was the Netherlands in 1969. Soon after, in 1971, Australia 
introduces Listed Property Trusts. 
 
In the U.S. the growth of this industry was fuelled by mortgage REITs and 
vehicles engaged mainly in land development and construction financing. 
During the 1973 oil embargo, mortgage REITs were hit hard the most. The 
Realty Trust Review was launched in March 1970 and devoted exclusively to 
public real estate securities. Sector specific vehicles were immediately 
introduced. As an example, the Health Care REIT (then Health Care Fund) was 
the first REIT in health care established in June 1970. Finally, NAREIT started 
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to produce a publicly available REIT index in January 1972 splitting the sample 
between equity, mortgage and hybrid REITs. In the 1980s, billions of U.S. dollars 
were raised in private placements due to the proliferation of real estate tax-
sheltered partnerships. Particularly, this era saw the birth of open-end mutual 
funds primarily investing in REITs, with the first one (National Real Estate 
Stock Fund) being established in 1985. Today one can count about 200 real 
estate mutual funds. The first largest real estate mutual fund was Cohen & 
Steers, and it had $26 billion assets under management. As far as REIT-related 
products are concerned, the first real estate ETF (iShares Dow Jones. U.S. real 
estate index fund) was launched in June 2000. After a year, more real estate 
ETFs followed and today there are about 20 ETFs only investing in REITs. 
 
After the downturn at the end of 1980s, Kimco Realty Corporation made the first 
equity REIT IPO in November 1991, while a month after the first REIT reached 
a market capitalisation of $1 billion. The introduction of the UPREIT structure 
started a consolidation period where these vehicles have become larger in size-
Simon Property Group is today the biggest REIT and has a market capitalisation 
of $23 billion. As far as the transparency and knowledge of such investment 
market and associated returns, in January 1997 one saw improvements thanks 
to the release of a real time index by NAREIT, which also joined up with EPRA 
and Euronext to launch the EPRA/NAREIT global real estate index in October 
2001. During the same period, Standard & Poor opened its indexes to REITs 
which became part of the biggest 500 companies traded in the U.S (initially 
only Equity Office Properties Trust and Equity Residential). According to the 
REITWatch report as of the 29th of August 2014, REITs being S&P 500 
constituents are 20 with size ranging from $5 to just over $53 billion, while 
S&P 400 mid-cap REIT constituents are 30 with size ranging from at $1.7 to 
just over $10.3 billion and S&P 600 small-cap REIT constituents are 35 with 
size ranging from $0.4 to just over $3.3 billion. Furthermore, the REITWatch 
report illustrates that there has been consolidation in the U.S. REIT industry: 
the constituents of S&P 500 are worth $410.3 billion, constituents of S&P 400 
mid-caps are worth $149.01 billion and constituents of S&P 600 small-caps are 
worth $50.4 billion. 
 
Today, about 40 countries have REIT legislation in place. The first Asian 
REIT was introduced in Japan in September 2001, while in Europe France 
adopted REIT legislation in 2003, Germany in 2007, and the UK in 2007. 
South Africa introduced REIT legislation in 2012. The significant presence 
of M&A activities in the REIT industry reveals the potential gains achievable 
by joining different companies. The reasons of this gain are several and have 
been explo8red in the literature. However, so far no REIT study has approached 
this phenomenon as the exercise of the option to acquire/merge to another firm. 
In this context the option would be exercised only if a potential growth is 
achievable. Particularly, these growth options represent exchange options, where 
one asset (shares of a company) is exchanged for another (shares of the other 
company involved in an M&A deal). 
 
Numerous questions arise in this article. What is unique about REITs? What is 
interesting about option pricing theory (OPT) being applied in the REIT 
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industry? Firstly, REITs offer a unique institutional setting with very codified 
and transparent corporate governance. Hence the option pricing revelation 
should be more easily identifiable. Secondly, the valuation of a REIT merger 
could be seen as the union of two funds, or in other words two asset portfolios 
that are combined together and REIT synergies rules. This article also explores 
factors that drive options of REIT M&As and this is because some prior 
empirical studies such as one by Hitt et al. (1990) illustrated that characteristics 
of firms contributed to the merged entity value. The four groups of variables 
explored in this article are conflict of interests-these are variables which benefits 
one stakeholder while disadvantaging another stakeholder, funding-variables 
that symbolise how REIT finance their expansion opportunities and growth-
those are variables when they are perceived positively by the markets, REITs 
grow-normally their share prices increase. Finally, specialisation shows the 
sector in the real estate industry that a particular REIT invests in. Finally, when 
M&A deals are financed through the combination of stocks and cash, this article 
alters the original Margrabe (1978) (henceforth Margrabe) model so that the 
model prices a M&A deal financed through cash and stocks. All the points raised 
in this paragraph are the contributions of this article. 
 
The study that is close to this article is Kim (1992). Kim (1992) developed an 
equilibrium option model in the context of option. At the heart of his study, he 
allowed prices to be dynamic. This article by mentioned three authors, follow the 
same concept. Although, the Margate model will be expanded but the expanded 
Margrabe model will be a closed one. For the modelling part, Kim (1992) start 
with the general equilibrium considerations-maximising the utility of individual, 
then have dimensional vector for various parameters and there is a risk-free 
default unit discount bond rate. Central to the analysis, is to determine the 
optimal investment policy or portfolio-similar to the illustration is this article. In 
order to explicitly to illustrate equilibrium models, Kim (1992) demonstrated two 
regimes-1 and 2. Regime 1 is on pure exchange economy where one is allowed to 
consume everything available at that time. More, goods are perishable. Kim 
(1992) states that in case similar to regime 1, a call option is written on another 
asset which is synonymous with B-S framework. In this article, it would be 
where deals are financed through only cash. Regime 2 is on the same pure 
exchange economy except the fact that an individual is given a constant-
absolute-risk-aversion utility. Kim (1992) opined that in that environment prices 
do not follow a time-homogenous diffusion process-drift and time are dependent 
on time because of the discounting factor. A latter situation would be suitable for 
hedging options (See; Sebehela 2015). That is, just like Kim (1992), this article 
derives alternative option valuation which can provide useful information when 
pricing options that cannot be explained by B-S framework. This is because 
despite that ad hoc B-S can price options in different circumstances but the 
equilibria and smiles are open-ended (See; Byun et al. 2018).Byun et al. (2018) 
investigate two scenarios: first, when implied volatility skew is treated as fixed 
function of moneyness (
𝑆
𝐾
). In the latter case, strike price (K) does not change 
and volatility floats as stock index (S) changes-sticky volatility method, second 
approach that they explored is when is when both K and implied volatility are 
fixed regardless of S level-sticky delta. Marcato et al. (2018) demonstrated that 
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when both K and implied volatility change with respect to the change in S, the 
volatilities tend to be much better than in sticky volatility and delta cases. 
 
In summary, our results illustrate that some REIT traits contribute to M&A 
option values and in certain cases REIT M&As might be driven by strategic 
positioning of firms. More, the results illustrate that when REITs merge, extra 
values are generated from deals in the form of exchange options. Due to the 
emerging of exchange options, liquidity in the REIT industry increases and 
more information spillover to stakeholders happens. Furthermore, one 
illustrates that some REIT characteristics systematically contribute to option 
values during M&A activities. Overall, results are in line with prior studies 
that analyzed abnormal returns in several industries. On the other hand, 
the impact of variables on emerging exchange options is consistent with t he  
peck i ng  o rder  t heory  ( POT) of finance and OPT. Despite the fact that 
some models have negative adjusted R-squared, the adjusted R-squared for 
the combined models show a significant improvement with more than one fifth 
of growth options explained by our estimation-Hartzell et al. (2005). The 
implications from the analysis are several. Firstly, when REIT firms merge, 
stakeholders will have better insights in REIT mergers if they price those 
M&A deals using option pricing techniques. Second, for accurate pricing and 
hedging, one can infer from coefficients that in certain cases it is costly and at 
other times it is cheap as illustrated by high and low c o e f f i c i e n t s  
respectively. Third, some REIT characteristics (i.e. conflicts of interest, 
internal funds and market risk) are important in explaining growth 
opportunities in mergers. Finally, zero options values suggest that REIT 
mergers might be driven by strategic objectives as opposed to financial gains. 
 
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 debates the related 
literature and section 3 discusses the theory behind modelling M&A options. 
Section 4 presents the data while section 5 presents results on empirical 
analysis. The last section concludes this study. 
 
2 Literature Review 
The literature review is divided into two sections; (i) M&A options-to understand 
real options in mergers and (ii) parameters impacting M&A behaviour-
parameters that influence value during mergers. As stated earlier, the 
contribution of this article is combining those two narratives. 
 
2.1 M&A Options 
M&A is a strategy in which firms engage themselves in expansion processes. 
Reasons cited as M&A drivers by previous studies include information 
asymmetry, governance, agency conflict, market timing and monopoly according 
to Hansen (1987) and Amihud et al. (1990). All those factors mentioned as 
reasons driving M&As are underpinned by one motive which is to increase 
profitability of firms by forming a well-managed merged entity. Previous studies 
value M&A deals using traditional valuation techniques (TVTs) such as 
discounted cash flows (DCFs) and traditional accounting principles (see 
Reinganum and Smith, 1983). One of the short comings of TVTs is that they 
cannot take into account flexibility embedded in M&A deals. Therefore, a pricing 
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technique that accounts for flexibility in M&A deals is needed and one such 
technique is OPT. The pricing of exchange options using closed-form solutions on 
two securities without barriers when exercise prices are uncertain can be traced 
back to Fisher (1978) and Margrabe (1978), although those studies were not 
explicit on whether exchange options are found within M&A framework. 
Although, the two models are similar; however, the exercise price in the Fisher 
model is fundamental price such as net asset value per share while the exercise 
in Margarbe model is a financial price such as share price. Both models draw 
their principles from the Black and Scholes (1973) (henceforth B-S) model. 
 
Some of the earliest study that was explicit in exploring option pricing within 
M&A framework is Benston et al. (1995), which is based on their argument on 
insurance put-option hypothesis (IPOH) without using a specific option pricing 
model. IPOH states that when one deposits money into a bank, there is a 
premium paid into the bank account which acts as insurance for the deposit 
because regulators use policies to force banks to meet certain minimum levels of 
liquidity. That premium is measured as the difference between acquisition price 
paid for target firm and the market value of a target firm. If the difference is 
positive then the difference is consistent with IPOH. The results were 
inconsistent with IPOH because acquiring banks wanted to increase risk or 
enhance operations of target firms so that returns of the merged entity increase 
from addition of new products. 
 
From early 2000s, option pricing within M&A framework compared flexibility 
values of discounted cash flows (DCFs) and real options-Qiu and Yeo (2003), and 
deferral options in M&As when one merging firm is private-Fuller et al. (2002). 
Officer (2004) and Subramanian (2004) are some of empirical studies that 
acknowledged limitations of options models like B-S model: according to them, 
these limitations were due to the type of options embedded in their data samples. 
They argue that options models should be improved in order to capture other 
parameters that were not captured by original options models such as the B-S 
model. 
 
Officer (2004) explored deals financed through combination of stocks and cash, in 
addition, when collars entice mergers. One of arguments put forward in relation 
to collars is that they allow specific exchange ratio conditional on certain price 
levels provided the potential merger stays within anticipated price levels. As in 
the REIT industry, it is a normal practice that exchange ratios at announcement 
and closing dates are the same, this article adopts the same principle. Due to the 
conditions of collars in M&As, Officer (2004) used both the B-S model and Asian 
option-pricing algorithms. The other trait of a collar is that its inclusion 
minimises re-negotiation possibilities when resolutions are passed, a 
phenomenon dissimilar to American options. Despite of differences in the B-S 
model and Asian option-pricing algorithms results, similar patterns were 
illustrated by both groups of results. 
 
The use of option pricing to value corporations has been used extensively, not 
only in real estate markets, where very recently Cline et al. (2014) explore stock 
options and combine them with REITs secondary equity offerings data to 
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investigate insider trading activities. From mid 2000s, Hackbarth and Morellec 
(2008) and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) started to value M&A synergies 
using option pricing techniques. Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) priced put 
options within B-S framework and, as in Bhagat et al. (1987); they assumed that 
the observed price is the difference between the underlying price and fractional 
put option**. Implied options prices and volatilities were modelled based on the 
logic of the later statement. Results indicated that there is a premium obtained 
by target firms from acquiring firms in M&A deals. Hackbarth and Morellec 
(2008) analysed stock returns behaviour based on real options approach. 
Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) argued that growth options in M&A context 
involves two firms entering one deal which implies that one is valuing expansion 
strategies of acquiring firms and exit strategies of target firms simultaneously. 
They designed a dynamic model of takeovers in order to account for many model 
parameters including competition, risks associated with M&As, firms operations 
and deferral possibilities. However, they acknowledged that the Margrabe model 
is appropriate in pricing exchange options when M&A deals are financed 
through stocks. Results of Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) indicate that risks 
decrease after M&A completion period while returns increase during the same 
period.  
 
After determining the exchange option value associated to each M&A deal, this 
article is also interested in identifying the sources of such value and hence 
whether there is a systematic component attached to specific REIT 
characteristics. 
 
2.2 Parameters Impacting M&A Behaviour 
Born et al. (1989) exemplified effects of M&As on wealth of shareholders of 
target firms. The sample was made of M&As over a period of 1969-1986. Born et 
al. (1989) used Market-Adjusted Return (MAR) method to define wealth and 
used different windows to calculate excess returns (ERs) and cumulative excess 
returns (CERs). For (+8;0) window ERs were statistically significant but CER 
were statistically insignificant, and for the rest of pre-M&A periods, ERs and 
CERs were statistically insignificant, for post-M&A period, ERs were 
statistically significant for (0;-10) window, and other post-M&A windows ERs 
and CERs were statistically insignificant. According to Womack (2012) the 
reason why excess returns are statistically insignificant especially in long run 
has to do with the fact that REIT M&As are beneficial to everyone. Born et al. 
(1989) argue that although ERs and CERs are statistically insignificant 
especially in the long run, excess returns presence illustrate information 
asymmetry in the REIT industry. From the 1990s, empirical studies on REIT 
M&As explored multiple factors that drive REIT M&As. Among cited REIT M&A 
drivers are sizes of firms, earnings growth, governance structures, value creation 
and information asymmetry, Mueller (1998) and Campbell et al. (2001 and 2005). 
Mueller (1998) illustrated that size has impact on the growth of REIT firms; 
although, in the long run what matters is funds from operations (FFOs) per 
share because dividends effects need to be accounted for in value calculations. In 
addition, Mueller (1998) stated that for small-cap and mid-cap REIT firms, 
                                                          
** A fractional put option is put option where one does not account for full option value. 
  7 
growth in value is largely bolstered by quality as opposed to size of merging 
firms over the 1994-1998 period. A full review of real estate merger motives is 
presented in Anderson et al. (2009). 
 
Campbell et al. (2001) explored REIT stocks financed M&As when target is a 
private firm. According Campbell et al. (2001), when target is private, acquiring 
firm would require positive returns because of presence of information 
asymmetry and this is consistent with blockholders hypothesis. Campbell et al. 
(2001) used CARs for acquiring and target firms to illustrate effects of 
information asymmetry on M&As. Starting from one-day window, day 0 to (-
1;0;+1) including (0;-1) windows, Campbell et al. (2001) showed that abnormal 
returns (ARs) coefficients are small and statistically significant. However, in the 
long run, ARs and CARs coefficients were statistically insignificant. Moreover, 
Campbell et al. (2001) used regressions and results illustrated that size (i.e. book 
value of acquirer in billions of dollars), ratio of acquirer size to target size 
(sizerat) for acquirer being part of umbrella partnership of REIT, UPREIT 
(ACU), geographical diversification (GD) and for transaction being announced in 
the fourth quartile (CFOUR) are all statistically significant, coefficients of size 
and GD are negative while sizerat, ACU and CFOUR coefficients are positive. 
 
Campbell et al. (2005) explored on how governance influence value creation in 
REIT M&As over the period of 1995-2001. Campbell et al. (2005) argue that 
governance structures in REITs during 1990s were influenced by UPREIT. Other 
than improvement of governance structure due to establishment of UPREIT, 
UPREIT brought in convertibles that benefited REIT shareholders. Campbell et 
al. (2005: 225) stated that “we find that wealth effects from central managerial 
changes are positively related to the degree to which payment takes the form of 
convertible equity units of UPREIT subsidiaries, and the minimum lock-up 
period for those units prior to conversion”. ARs were higher when target 
management were part of new REIT structure and lower when target 
management were not part of new REIT structure. Daniels and Phillips (2007) 
explored impact of financial advisors on REIT M&As over the period of 1981-
2001. The main hypothesis in Daniels and Phillips (2007) was to find out if 
financial advisors bring any benefits in REIT M&As. The results indicated that a 
financial advisors especially ones with good monitoring skills reduces levels of 
information asymmetry. Moreover, the reduction of information asymmetry was 
found to have a positive impact on REIT values, stocks, options, regions and 
divest of REITs. 
 
Finally, after valuation and due diligence, acquiring firms have a choice of 
financing prospective M&A deals through cash and/or stocks. M&A deals that 
involve undervalued firms tend to be financed through cash while M&A deals 
that are made up of firms which are overvalued tend to be stock financed, as 
Fuller et al. (2002) argue. Womack (2012) illustrated that the REIT industry is 
different from most industries in terms of M&A financing as most deals are 
financed through combination of stocks and cash. Ghosh et al. (2012) present 
evidence of excess use of cash holdings leading to value destruction in REIT 
corporate acquisitions. Fundamentally, one infer from prior studies such as 
Leland (2007) that systematic components that contribute to values of firms can 
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be grouped as follows: beta (i.e. risk), insider shareholding, institutional holding, 
management style (self or not), board type (staggered or not) contribute to 
conflict of interest; return on equity (ROE), volatilities of acquirer and target 
respectively, growth (M&A era), ratings, dividend yield and leverage contribute 
to organic growth of firms; debt and equity forms funding type for financing 
growth and REIT type include whether a listed fund is a REIT or not are due to 
the specialisation of a firm. 
 
3 Modelling M&A Options 
In pricing exchange options; firstly, this article presents cash-financed only 
options; secondly, the stocks-financed only options and finally, the article 
extended the Margrabe (1978) such that it is suitable for pricing exchange 
options financed through a combination of cash and stocks. 
 
3.1 Cash-Financed Only Options 
When M&A deals are financed through cash only, the B-S model is used to price 
exchange options rising from the right of target companies to sell their shares for 
a pre-defined sum of money. When two firms merge, the emerging option 
represents a put option that target firm obtains from the acquiring firm and the 
put option can be computed as follows: 
 
𝑝 = 𝑋𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝑆0𝑁(−𝑑1)    (1) 
with 
𝑑1 =
𝑙𝑛(
𝑆0
𝐾
)+(𝑟+
𝜎2
2
)𝜏
𝜎√𝜏
     (2) 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎√𝜏     (3) 
where 𝑝 is the put option, 𝑆0 is the spot price (i.e. target price), 𝑋 is the exercise 
price (i.e. the deal value per share which SNL Financial calculates as amount 
paid for target acquisition over shares used to calculate deal, those shares 
include ordinary shares and operating units outstanding), 𝑟 is the continuous 
risk-free interest rate, 𝜏 is tau which represents time to expiration (in this case 
time to expiration starts when the merger is announced until when the deal is 
closed), 𝜎 is the volatility of the stock, 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 are probabilities of being in-the-
money position, 𝑁(𝑑1) and 𝑁(𝑑2) are univariate cumulative normal density 
functions with upper integral limits 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 respectively. 
 
3.2 Stocks-Financed Only Options 
When mergers are only stock-financed the Margrabe (1978) (from here 
Margrabe) model is an appropriate model. The Margrabe model with no cost of 
carry is illustrated as follows: 
 
𝐶[𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝜏] = 𝐾𝑆1𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑆2𝑁(𝑑2)     (4) 
with 
𝑑1 =
𝑙𝑛(
𝐾𝑆1
𝑆2
)+(
𝜎𝑝
2
2
)𝜏
𝜎𝑝√𝜏
      (5a) 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝑝√𝜏      (5b) 
?̂?𝑝 = √𝜎1 + 𝜎2 − 2𝜎1𝜎2𝜌1,2     (6) 
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where 𝑐 is the long call option, 𝑆1 is the acquiring asset, 𝑆2 is the target asset, 𝜎1 
and 𝜎2 are volatilities of assets one and two respectively, 𝑟 is the continuous risk-
free interest rate, ?̂?𝑝 is the combined volatility of two assets, 𝜌1,2 is the 
correlation coefficient between the two assets, 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 are probabilities of being 
in-the-money position, 𝑁(𝑑1) and 𝑁(𝑑2) are univariate cumulative normal 
density functions with upper integral limits 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 respectively. During 
M&As, the acquiring firm sometime offers an exchange ratio fraction, 𝐾 of its 
own shares in exchange of shares of the target company. The reason why 𝑆1 is 
multiplied by the exchange ratio because the SNL Financial defines the 
exchange ratio as “number of the common stocks of the buyer (i.e. acquiring firm) 
to be exchanged for common stocks of seller (i.e. target firm)”. The estimated 
volatilities of 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 are from their historical prices as historical volatilities 
are model free. This implies that those historical volatilities are very good in 
predicting future volatilities as implied volatilities predict future volatilities 
well. The positive and negative sign before 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 illustrate that 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 sold 
and bought respectively. Any income generated by underlying assets is treated 
as dividends in order to avoid over estimation of options prices. 
 
This article uses the Margrabe model with no cost of carry because of poor 
quality of the data used in this article. Issues leading to poor quality of data will 
be discussed under data section of this article. 
 
3.3 Cash and Stocks Financed Options 
Then, the Margarbe (1978) model is extends such that it suitable for pricing 
exchange options when financed through a combination cash and stocks. The 
main model assumption is that for stocks and cash financed M&A deals, M&A 
optionality is disentangled in combinational funding by assuming that cash and 
stocks are mutually exclusive (i.e. correlation is zero). In other words, the 
amount of stocks and cash injected in an M&A deal depends on how the target 
firm shareholders want to funded in terms funding types. The phenomenon can 
be traced back to Officer (2004) and Subramanian (2004). 
 
𝐶[(𝑆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 + 𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠), 𝑆2, 𝜏] = 𝐾(𝑆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 + 𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠)𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑆2𝑁(𝑑2) (7) 
with 
𝑑1 =
𝑙𝑛(
(𝑆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡+𝐾𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠)
𝑆2
)+(
𝜎𝑝
2
2
)𝜏
𝜎𝑝√𝜏
    (8) 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝑝√𝜏     (9a) 
?̂?𝑝𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡;𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 = √𝜎1 + 𝜎2    (9b) 
?̂?𝑝1;2 = √𝜎1 + 𝜎2 − 2𝜎1𝜎2𝜌1,2   (9c) 
where 𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 is the amount of stocks injected into the M&A deal over 
outstanding ordinary shares of the acquirer, 𝑆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 is the price per share of the 
acquiring firm (i.e. the spot price of the acquirer at the time of the merger which 
is made up of cash injected in the merger over outstanding ordinary shares of the 
acquirer). That is, the 𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 in eq. (8) is similar to the 𝑆1 in eq. (4) and the 𝑆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 
is the extra parameter due to cash injection in the M&A deal. The volatility of 𝑆1 
and 𝑆2 is illustrated by ?̂?𝑝1;2 and ?̂?𝑝𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡;𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠  illustrates volatility of 𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 and 𝑆𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 
(i.e. volatility of 𝑆1). The correlation coefficient between spot price and stocks 
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amount; 𝜌𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡;𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 is zero because positive correlation decreases options values 
while negative correlation increases options values. That is, cash and stocks 
financing in M&A deal are additive. The correlation coefficient of the price of the 
acquirer spot price (i.e. spot price at the time of the merger and stocks amount) 
and the price of the target firm, 𝜌1,2 is taken into account. The rest of the 
variables are the same as in the non-altered Margarbe model. 
 
4 Data 
The total sample size is made of 178 M&As. Some are mergers between two 
REITs and others are mergers between a REIT and a REOC, and the 
remaining between a REIT and a non-REIT firm (i.e. financial services and/or 
investment management, and conglomerates). The sample is taken from SNL 
Financial and some other economic and financial variables are obtained from 
Bloomberg and Thomson/DataStream. Out of 178 M&A deals, 121 (i.e. 
67.98%) deals are public-to-public mergers and the remaining 57 (i.e. 32.02%) 
are public-to-private mergers. Since our analysis requires the availability of 
share prices for both target and acquiring firms, this article focuses on the 
former in our analysis and one also needs to reduce the sample by further 15 
deals because the available data is incomplete. Given that preliminary data has 
short comings, this article does not present it but gives an overview of 
preliminary-both acquiring and target firms. The preliminary data on acquiring 
firms is as follows. 
 
Most deals were in the shopping centres sector, followed by multi-family, then 
health care and the rest of other sectors. In terms of deal sizes, most valuable 
deals were in the diversified sector followed by shopping centres and offices, the 
health care and the rest of sectors. According to the REITWatch report as the 
29 t h  of  August 2014, the industrial sector had the highest performance, 
followed by shopping centres and then rest of the sectors. In addition, the 
REITWatch report shows that in 2006, every sector’s annual return excluding 
diversified and self-storage were more than 20% per annum. In 2008, all 
sectors excluding self-storage had negative annual returns-probably because 
the self-storage sector has defensive stock characteristics. If one adopts a 
principle similar to Bhagat et al. (1987), and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010) 
using the differences between mean and median, spreads significantly different 
from zero are found in every group especially in the funding group. This 
evidence supports the fact assumption that funding group variables should 
contribute more to options values than other variable groups. And the 
preliminary data on target firms is as follows. 
 
In the conflict of interest group, all variables are positively skewed except 
institutional shareholding (i.e. institut) and b e i n g  s e l f -
m a n a g e d  ( i . e .  Msself). In other words, r i s k  ( i . e .  beta), i n s i d e r  
s h a r e h o l d i n g  ( i . e .  insider) and s t a g g e r e d  b o a r d  o r  n o t  
( i . e . Sboard) should contribute more to options values than institut and 
Msself. In the growth group, all variables are positively skewed except REOC 
and dividend. All the specialisation group variables are positively skewed. 
Therefore, specialisation group variables should contribute significantly to 
v a l u e s  o f  options. In both acquiring and target firms, there were issues 
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relating to poor quality of data. 
 
From the entire sample of downloaded M&A deals, some issues of data 
quality are raised for some M&A deals which lack observations for all the 
required calculations in the two empirical hypotheses. Poor quality of data 
issues include: no dividends period or recorded dividends, missing data points 
in between first and last data points, no coupon rates recorded on debt, 
equity and debt not recorded, and data recorded over short periods (i.e. less 
than a year and therefore, one cannot estimate historical volatilities over 
required period). Although not in every case, SNL Financial removes the target 
firms from its database once they are taken over and it only lists the merged 
entity. This is part of data cleaning and storage process by SNL Financial. 
Hence, most data shortage is on the target firms. In certain cases, share price 
series of target firms stop way before the M&A announcement date. Another 
parameter which is important in calculating exchange options is the exchange 
ratio of each deal. Hence, one had to dismiss 10 M&A deals for which SNL 
Financial did not record exchange ratios. Some M&A exchange ratios were 
collected from the Thomson DataStream. On dividends, SNL Financial has 
dividends on 47 firms of the final sample and all annual dividends periods are 
shorter than 7 years, therefore dividend yields for 11 firms were obtained from 
Bloomberg terminal. 
 
In total 72 M&A deals are left out from the final sample, which means the final 
sample is made up of 106 transactions. In the final sample, one also kept a 
very small number of deals where one of the two firms appeared already in 
another deal (i.e. it merged more than once during the 1994-2010 sample 
period). Our GARCH (1,1) calculations illustrate that during the sample 
period, the U.S. REIT industry was in a bull market phase as spot volatilities 
converge to their long-term average volatilities from the top. Therefore, 
financing those REIT M&A deals was easier than in other more bullish periods 
as described in-Bygrave and Timmons (1986). Table 1 exemplifies some 
appropriate M&A characteristics of our sample: 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Acquiring Firms 
Effect Variable Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Skewness 
Kurtosi
s 
Conflicts of 
Interest 
beta 0.62 0.59 0.16 0.91 0.18 -0.15 -0.33 
insider (%) 8.40 3.87 0.00 57.40 11.26 2.56 7.94 
instit (%) 92.97 97.18 39.57 110.58 92.97 7.8 60.92 
msself 0.93 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 -3.55 10.86 
sboard 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.39 1.63 0.68 
Growth 
ROE (%) 12.15 7.07 0.00 226.84 26.01 6.12 45.67 
dividend 1.00 1.00 0.00 11.00 1.20 4.75 36.19 
volatility 0.40 0.26 0.00 1.26 0.35 0.08 0.74 
audit fees 
($mn/p.a.) 
14.36 14.24 0.91 29.00 3.06 -3.24 14.68 
growth 2001 2002 1994 2009 4.18 -0.20 -1.32 
rat_inv 0.64 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 -0.62 -1.66 
Funding 
tf_debt ($mn) 1,175.47 525.9 0 
13,276.2
0 
2,116.26 4.30 21.02 
tf_FFOs ($ mn) 1,957.14 596.4 4.93 
24,472.7
0 
4,217.69 4.30 19.27 
tf_cash ($mn) 1,585.26 239.62 0 
24,472.7
0 
4,233.44 4.49 20.52 
tf_stock ($ mn) 402.56 22.1 0 3,310.70 770.84 2.61 6.44 
tf_ps ($ mn) 7.01 0.00 0.00 175.00 29.64 4.74 22.6 
tf_cou ($ mn) 5.56 0.00 0.00 67.41 11.93 4.84 22.41 
Specialisatio
n (i.e. 
sectors) 
sc 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.23 5.38 40.30 
ind 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.20 5.24 29.92 
mf 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.20 7.39 71.40 
diversified 0.72 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 -0.99 -1.04 
off 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 3.57 10.91 
Target Firms 
Effect Variable Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Skewness 
Kurtosi
s 
Conflicts of 
Interest 
beta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
insider (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
instit (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
msself 0.78 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.42 -1.36 -0.14 
sboard 0.51 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.51 -0.04 -2.09 
Growth 
ROE (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
dividend 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
volatility 0.43 0.19 0.00 1.34 0.46 0.07 0.49 
audit fees ($mn/pa) 13.24 13.28 10.21 15.66 1.16 -2.85 7.56 
growth 2001 2002 1994 2009 4.18 -0.20 -1.32 
rat_inv 0.64 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 -0.62 -1.66 
Specialisatio
n (i.e. 
sectors) 
sc 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.27 4.11 21.32 
ind 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.19 5.39 30.92 
mf 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.18 3.85 35.49 
diversified 0.84 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.39 -1.40 1.50 
off 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 1.99 2.01 
Note: beta is for the risk, insider is for insider ownership, ROE is return on equity, dividend is dividend paid, tf is for total funds, FFOs is 
funds from operations (i.e. internal funds), pf is for preference shares and cou is common operating units, msself is for self-managed, 
sboard is for staggered board, $mn is for millions in U.S. dollars, growth and rat_inv (i.e. investment rating) symbolise M&A period (i.e. 
year) and for investment grade respectively, and they applicable in a similar manner to acquiring and target firms, and growth is based on 
announcement year as opposed to completion one, msself, growth and all specialisations variables are identified by dummies, sc is for 
shopping centres and it includes sc, regional malls and outlet centres, Ind is for industrial and it includes ind and self-storage, mf is for 
multi-family and it includes mf, manufactured homes and residential homebuilders, and off is for offices. 
 
In table 1, from the conflict of interest group, beta (i.e. risk) and being self-
managed (Msself) are negatively skewed while other parameters-i.e. insider 
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shareholding (insider), institutional holdings (instit) and staggered board or not 
(Sboard)-are positively skewed and hence contribute more to options values. 
Moreover, positively skewed parameters from the conflict of interest group 
tend to have higher standard deviations. This is one of the reasons why insider, 
instit and Sboard contribute more to options values. In the growth group, ROE, 
the dividend yield and volatility are positively skewed while auditing (audit) 
fees, growth period and rating investment (Rat_Inv) are negatively skewed. 
The reason why dividend yield and volatility contribute more to options 
values is partly due to OPT. As far as ROE is concerned, if earnings are 
retained in business then that retained money can be used for expansion 
purposes. The reason why audit fees contribute less to options values is because 
audit fees represent cash outflows which minimise the money left in the 
business to be reinvested. Growth is during the period of a continuous and 
steady growth (i.e. 1990s) of REIT firms; therefore, any positively change had 
little impact on option values as the M&A activity was already high. As far as 
Rat_Inv is concerned, since properties are speculative investments by nature 
and take into account all parameters that drive property values; therefore, the 
Rat_Inv does not change the real rating of properties. All the different types of 
financing are positively skewed; this implies that they contribute more to 
options values. This might be due to the fact that funding whether of debt or 
equity nature contributes positively to the value of firm. Gatchev et al. (2009) 
share the same view on how funds contribute to values of companies, even if 
different types of funds to company values differently (e.g. POT). 
 
From the specialisation group, shopping centres (SC), industrial (Ind), multi-
family (MF) and offices (Off) are positively skewed while diversified is 
negatively skewed. The reason why being a diversified contributes less to options 
values is because most of the U.S. REIT firms are specialised; moreover, 
Anderson et al. (2009) illustrate that it is more advantageous to be a specialised 
REIT firm in the U.S. than to be a diversified firm. On the other hand, 
Anderson et al. (2009) find that diversification costs out way diversification 
benefits in the U.S. REIT industry. If one explore average group spreads, one 
notices that the spread for the conflict of interest is 6.71%, 49.75% for the 
growth group and -0.40% for the specialisation group. Similar spreads can be 
inferred from Bhagat et al. (1987), and Sorwar and Sudarsanam (2010). 
Positive spreads are desired as they illustrate amount of money that one can 
make by taking position in a certain market. The reason why the growth group 
reports the highest spread(s) may lie on the fact that variables include 
financial option parameters such as volatility and dividend yields. The average 
spread for the funding group is left out because for the target firms, the 
funding values are missing (i.e. data provider does not have them). In recoding 
dates, SNL Financial provides M&A announcement and closing dates for each 
M&A deal with no extension or possible termination dates on all M&As; 
therefore, it is assumed that all options are of European nature. The 
announcement date is decided in two ways, SNL Financial either takes the 
earliest event date as the announcement date or where there is letter of intent 
(LOI) dated prior to the definitive agreement date, SNL Financial registers the 
LOI date as the announcement date. The closure date is estimated by SNL 
Financial based on interviews with respective companies involved in M&As and 
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should the actual date be different, SNL Financial changes the date accordingly 
after the M&A completion (hence only the modified date is observed). 
 
5 Empirical Analysis 
In presenting options values, this article separates cash financed deals from 
stocks financed ones. Furthermore, the study distinguishes between hot and cold 
M&A deals. Table 2 illustrates options values: 
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Table 2: Options Values during 1994-2010 Period 
Model Type Mean Median Min Max Std Dev No Skewness Kurtosis 
B-S model 3.92 2.17 0.26 29.02 5.22 49 3.26 12.93 
Margrabe model 3.24 1.12 0 33.92 6.23 57 3.4 12.62 
M&A Type         
REIT & REIT 3.55 1.76 0 18.19 5.83 66 3.28 12.05 
REIT & REOC 3.71 1.77 0.88 33.92 6.04 25 3.14 10.92 
REOC & REOC 3.79 1.8 0.26 29.02 6.47 7 3.31 11.53 
NONRE & NONRE 3.61 1.77 0.65 12.19 5.92 8 3.34 12.39 
Hot Sectors         
Diversified 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Health Care/Hotel 0.85 0.81 0 1.72 0.86 3 0.16 0 
Industrial/ Self-
Storage 
3.65 0.93 0.02 18.19 7.17 6 2.38 5.72 
Multi-Family 1.65 1.08 0 6.86 1.96 18 1.49 1.76 
Office 1.98 1.98 0.83 3.13 1.62 3 0 0 
Shopping Centres 3.27 0.39 0 17.09 6.8 6 2.39 5.78 
Cold Sectors         
Conglomerate 1.77 1.02 0.65 3.64 1.63 3 1.63 0 
Correctional Services 2.77 2.77 2.77 2.77 0 1 0 0 
Diversified 1.65 1.65 1.51 1.8 0.2 2 0 0 
Financial Services 2.32 2.32 0.98 3.66 1.89 2 0 0 
Health Care/Hotel 4.19 2.43 0 24.82 6.32 15 2.89 8.96 
Industrial/ Self-
Storage 
2.34 2.03 0.54 4.77 1.84 4 0.8 -0.25 
Multi-Family 3.51 4.04 0 8.21 3.05 11 0.25 -1.3 
Office 4.3 1.78 0 29.02 8.1 12 3.04 9.65 
Power Generation 33.92 33.92 33.92 33.92 0 1 0 0 
Shopping Centres 3.19 1.44 0 15.52 4.66 16 1.88 2.77 
Wireless Telecom 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 0 1 0 0 
Note: health care and hotel are put together because they are within hospitality industry, industrial and self-storage are put together 
because they offer similar services; multi-family, apartments and residential homes are grouped together as they offer similar services, 
outlet-centres and regional malls with shopping centres are put together because of their similarities. Each option is either B-S or 
Margrabe option not both, N.: is sample size for that particular variable, REIT is for real estate investment trusts, REOC is for real estate 
operating company, and nonre if for non-real estate company although nonre do have some investments in real estate sectors. Sectors are 
grouped per acquiring and target firms sector specialisation and in case where acquiring and target firms are from different sectors, the 
acquiring firm’s sector is taken as the sectors for each M&A deal. Definition of hot and cold is adopted from Colak et al. (2008), basically, 
hot is when event reached its peaks or higher levels (i.e. 1990s) and cold (i.e. 2000s) is the opposite of hot. From hot sectors; from shopping 
centres, 2 target firms are not shopping centres firms, from multi-family, 2 target firms are not multi-family sectors, from industrial/self-
storage, 2 target firms are not industrial/self-storage firms, from offices, 1 target firm is not within office sector and from diversified, 2 
target firms are non-diversified firms. From cold sectors, within office sector, 7 target firms are not office firms, from shopping centres, 2 
target firms are non-shopping centres firms, from multi-family, 4 target firms are not multi-family firms, from healthcare/hotel, 7 target 
firms are not in health care/hotel sectors, from industrial/self-storage, 1 target firm is not from industrial/self-storage sector and from 
diversified, 1 target firm is non-diversified firm. 
 
Table 2 illustrates that most M&As were financed through stocks (including 
stocks and cash) than cash and this is in line with Womack (2012) who finds that 
financing REIT mergers with completely or partly stocks as a common 
phenomenon. Some curves are positively skewed while a few are normally 
distributed, this expected as options payoffs are non-linear in shape. Peiro (1999) 
stated that marginal returns are higher when skewness is positive than 
negative. Cash financed options seem to be less skewed than stocks financed 
options and this is due the fact that the B-S options incorporates risk-free rates, 
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which minimises mispricing of options values. Most REIT M&As took place in 
retail, multi-family and offices sectors, and one of the reasons is that those 
sectors performed better than other REIT sectors. Hotels make less than 10% of 
the U.S. REIT industry and their share prices performed poorly at least in the 
last ten years. Another reason that might have led to the poor performance of 
hotels is that their lease and income structures tend to be risky. It seems that 
the mergers in the hotel sector were largely for strategic reasons. Harrison et al. 
(2011) stated that hotels offer organic growth as they present a relatively low 
debt ratio. 
 
Lastly, when one compares cold and hots sectors, most deals took place during 
the cold period. This is due to fact that during hot periods markets are very noisy 
and some investors do get overcompensated during the hot periods. Therefore, it 
is wiser to wait for the cold periods so that valuations of firms’ valuations 
represent fair values. Colak et al. (2008) stated that although one can earn good 
returns during hot periods; however, hot periods have their own challenges that 
erode returns if risks are not properly mitigated during those periods. Given that 
clustering tend to occur in multiple options, this article verifies the independence 
of the options. Since options are non-linearly distributed, a chi-square test for 
two scaling constants is used as linearity is not a requirement for chi-square 
tests given that its distributions are truncated similarly to options values. Table 
3 illustrates independence test results: 
 
Table 3: Statistically Significance Difference of Unequal Means 
Variable Difference Chi-Stat P-Value Decision 
Leverage 4th vs 1st quartile 22.02*** 0.00 Reject H0 
Rating 
Investment vs speculative 
grade 
38.11*** 0.00 Reject H0 
Acquirer’s institutional 
holding 
4th vs 1st quartile 15.07*** 0.00 Reject H0 
M&A Cash vs non-cash financed 50.98*** 0.00 Reject H0 
M&A 
Stocks vs. non-stocks 
financed 
50.98*** 0.00 Reject H0 
FFOs Small vs medium 42.37*** 0.00 Reject H0 
FFOs Medium vs large 26.51*** 0.00 Reject H0 
Acquirer audit fees 4th vs 1st quartile 19.00*** 0.00 Reject H0 
REITs 
Specialised vs non-
specialised 
53.38*** 0.00 Reject H0 
Debt Small vs medium 42.69*** 0.00 Reject H0 
Debt Small vs large 42.26*** 0.00 Reject H0 
Debt Medium vs large 25.16*** 0.00 Reject H0 
Note: Chi-square independence test, the critical chi-stat is 3.84 for all variables tested, ***, ** and * denote alphas at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively, acquirer audit fees and acquirer institutional holding, we compared 4th and 1st quartiles as 2nd and 3rd quartiles might 
have similar traits because of their proximity; therefore making them statistically insignificant, H0 is the null hypothesis, cash financed 
means only financed through cash, non-cash financed means financed through stocks or combination of stocks and cash, stock financed 
means only financed through stocks, non-stock financed means financed through cash only, amount sizes definitions were adopted from 
Mueller (1998); 0-$500 million are classified as small-caps, 501-$1,000 million are mid-caps, $1,001-$4,000 million are large-caps and above 
$4,000 million are mega-caps, and last some parameters were left of out because their sample was small, i.e. less than ten. 
 
The null hypotheses are rejected at significantly high p-values; this implies that 
means of two groups are statistically different from each other. Leverage for 
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different quartiles should be different as the more leverage a REIT firm has on 
its balance sheet, the higher are expansion chances without major difficulty. 
Allen et al. (2000) stated that coefficients of leverage are positive and 
statistically significant because leverage is advantageous to REIT firms during 
expansion periods. Investment and speculative grades are different as most 
investors prefer investing in investment grade than speculative one. The reason 
why different quartiles of acquirer institutional holdings are different might be 
due to the fact that REITs are formed by investors who have a common goal. 
Therefore, high institutional holdings eliminate unnecessary conflicts of interest 
in managing REIT firms. 
 
Cash and non-cash (i.e. stocks) deals are different because the latter are 
normally overvalued while cash (i.e. non-stocks) deals are normally undervalued. 
Daniels and Phillips (2007) echoed similar view. The availability of either 
internal (i.e. FFOs) or external funds (i.e. debt) allows acquirer to source funds 
during growth phases, although preference would be given to FFOs as per POT 
and amount of debt should ideally not matter in good real estate markets. 
Finally, on audit fees, Bairagi and Dimovski (2012) found that firms should be 
concerned with net proceeds in initial public offering (IPOs) as the amount that 
matters in REIT firms is only net proceeds when funding growth of firms. In the 
U.S. it seems that it is easier for specialised REITs to expand than diversified 
REIT firms. Campa and Hernando (2004) reported that several combinations of 
variables as well as univariate regression results show the importance of each 
single factor in explaining growth option values. This article derives a non-linear 
model to map various parameters against options values as below. An 
exponential equation can be represented as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑋1𝑡
𝛽1𝑋2𝑡
𝛽2𝑒𝜇𝑡     (10) 
One advantage of using an exponential model is that it can be transformed into a 
linear equation using logarithm functions. On the other hand, independent 
variables in linear regressions are elastic in relation to the dependent variable in 
linear models. Logarithms are taken on both sides and eq. (10) is re-arranged: 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛(𝐴) + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛(𝑋1𝑡) + 𝛽𝑡𝑙𝑛(𝑋2𝑡) + 𝜇𝑡   (11) 
where 𝐴 is a constant (i.e. y intercept), 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are estimated parameters, and 
𝑋1𝑡 and 𝑋2𝑡 are independent variables, 𝜇𝑡 is the mean and 𝑌𝑡 is dependent 
variable. Now, one assumes that  𝑙𝑛(𝐴) = 𝛼, 𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑡) = 𝑌𝑡, 𝑙𝑛(𝑋1𝑡) = 𝑋1𝑡 and 
𝑙𝑛(𝑋2𝑡) = 𝑋2𝑡, then: 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡    (12) 
Given that 𝑌𝑡, options values are non-linear, it is decided to keep dependent 
variable as 𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑡) in order to maintain non-linearity approximation of options 
values. Therefore, eq. (12) becomes: 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑌𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡    (13) 
After all the transformations, one can see that eq. (13) is a log-linear model 
simultaneously accounts for linear and non-linear distributions. More, eq. (13) is 
used to test different effects and models heterogeneity controlled. Models for 
conflict of interest are called conflicts, models for organic growth effect are called 
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growth, models for funding effect are called funding and models for specialisation 
effect are called specialisation and models for combined effects are called 
amalgamated. For conflict of interest, target firms parameters were left out as 
there is limited data on those parameters. Table 4 illustrates results for conflicts: 
 
Table 4: Option Value Determinants: Conflicts of Interest 
Effect Variable C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
C
o
n
fl
ic
t 
o
f 
In
te
re
st
 
Constant 
1.5905*** 
(0.000) 
0.9070*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0042*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8614*** 
(0.0000) 
1.1391*** 
(0.0000) 
0.5487 
(0.2354) 
1.1004** 
(0.0273) 
ac_beta 
-0.8474 
(0.1198)     
-0.1531 
(0.8215) 
-0.2719 
(0.6933) 
ac_insider 
 
0.0179* 
(0.0646)    
0.0221** 
(0.0424) 
0.0198* 
(0.0779) 
ac_instit 
  
0.0001*** 
(0.0000)   
0.0001*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0001**** 
(0.0049) 
ac_msself 
   
0.1330 
(0.4195)  
0.4022*** 
(0.0090)  
ac_sboard 
    
-0.4260** 
(0.0223) 
 
-0.4370* 
(0.0736) 
Adjusted R2 1.81% 4.13% 1.24% -1.32% 2.61% 5.58% 6.91% 
White Test 
0.1569 
(0.6920) 
1.2007 
(0.2732) 
0.3433 
(0.5579) 
0.1018 
(0.7507) 
3.2111* 
(0.0731) 
4.1578 
(0.9651) 
1.7298 
(0.7853) 
Durbin-Watson 1.54 1.52 1.59 2.08 1.69 1.68 1.75 
F-Stat 
2.3256 
(0.1317) 
4.3164** 
(0.0411) 
1.7180 
(0.1953) 
1.1434 
(0.2849) 
3.0076* 
(0.0870) 
1.8267 
(0.1377) 
2.0022 
(0.1085) 
Akaike IC 2.60 2.52 2.53 2.44 2.54 2.56 2.56 
Schwartz IC 2.60 2.58 2.61 2.51 2.61 2.73 2.75 
Hannan-Quinn IC 2.57 2.55 2.56 2.47 2.57 2.63 2.63 
Note: Each model maps logarithm of option price against independent variable(s), for each model, the first number is the co-efficient of 
independent variable followed by p-value, ***, ** and * denote alphas at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; ac is for acquiring firm, beta is the 
risk, instit is for institutional holding, msself is for self-managed, sboard is for staggered board and insider is for insider shareholding. 
Dummies identify ac_msself and ac_sboard. As ac_msself and ac_sboard are correlated; therefore, we decided to have conflicts 6 and 7 so 
that ac_msself and ac_sboard are not in the same model. White test is for heteroscedasticity and durbin-watson for autocorrelation. For 
white test, the first numbers is the co-efficient followed by p-value and, akaike, schwarz and hannan-quinn criteria compares models in 
relative terms. The C in the first row of the table 4 stands for conflict of interest. 
 
In column 2 and 3, insider ownership and institutional holdings are positive and 
statistically significant. The positive insider ownership coefficient can be 
attributed to the fact that insiders have more information about a REIT firm 
than outsiders. Moreover, insiders will do everything in their power in order to 
be overcompensated in M&A deals. Capozza and Sequin (2003) echoed positive 
impact of insider ownership in REIT firms. The positive coefficient of 
institutional holding has to do with the POT as when firms expand, they first 
look at amount of cash available as it is cheap considering than debt as has 
benefit of being tax-deductible in the case of a REIT firm. In the context of 
REITs, money first comes from insiders (i.e. people owning and managing a 
REIT firm); thereafter, retail investors; lastly, institutional investors. The latter 
statement also explains why the coefficient of institutional holding is small. In 
conflict 5, staggered board is negative and statistically significant because board 
members serve on firms boards for a specific period; therefore, there is no 
incentive for sitting board members to contribute to a REIT firm beyond their 
tenure. The statistical significance of insider ownership and institutional 
holdings in conflicts 6 and 7 is for the same reasons mentioned earlier. Msself 
and Sboard are correlated; therefore, in order disentangle the correlation 
between those two variables, there are two conflicts; i.e. 6 and 7. The F-statistics 
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illustrate that there are structural breaks in conflicts 2 and 5; however, one 
cannot do anything about them given that the analysis is based on cross 
sectional data. The White test illustrates that there is white noise in conflict 5. 
Table 5 illustrated funding: 
 
Table 5: Option Value Determinants: Funding 
Effect Variable F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 
F
u
n
d
in
g
 
constant 
1.0618** 
(0.0297) 
0.9042*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1206 
(0.7272) 
0.1272 
(0.7140) 
-0.0899 
(0.8052) 
debt 
0.0071 
(0.9898)   
0.0238 
(0.8245)  
leverage 
 
0.3899 
(0.3954)  
 
0.4602 
(0.2424) 
FFOs 
  
0.1506*** 
(0.0078) 
0.1456** 
(0.0178) 
0.1534*** 
(0.0062) 
Adjusted R2 -1.02% -0.35% 6.46% 5.55% 6.44% 
White Test 
4.0203** 
(0.0450) 
1.3280 
(0.2492) 
1.1558 
(0.2823) 
5.9624 
(0.3099) 
4.8502 
(0.4344) 
Durbin-Watson 1.85 1.83 1.86 1.87 1.85 
F-Stat 
0.0003 
(0.9857) 
0.6537 
(0.4207) 
7.8423*** 
(0.0001) 
3.9080** 
(0.0233) 
4.4072** 
(0.0147) 
Akaike IC 2.54 2.53 2.46 2.48 2.47 
Schwartz IC 2.59 2.58 2.51 2.56 2.55 
Hannan-Quinn IC 2.56 2.55 2.48 2.51 2.50 
Note: Each model maps logarithm of option price against independent variable(s), for each model, the first number is the co-efficient of 
independent variable followed by p-value, ***, ** and * denote alphas at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; ac is for acquiring firm, debt is 
illustrated in three ways, first, debt is a sum of stocks, cash, preference shares and common operating units all over total funds, and that 
ratio is subtracted from one and FFOs are funds from operations (i.e. internal funds in this case). The reason why debt is defined the way 
is it is because its results are consistent with prior empirical studies on debt’s impact on values of firms. When we use other debt 
definitions, actual debt and debt as proportion of total funds, results are inconsistent with debt’s impact on values of firms. White test is for 
heteroscedasticity and durbin-watson for autocorrelation. For white test, the first numbers is the co-efficient followed by p-value and, 
akaike, schwarz and hannan-quinn criteria compares models in relative terms. We tested whether options values if they financed through 
stocks and/or combination of cash, or cash only matters, the results had a negative co-efficient is-0.1793 with a p-value is 0.2614. The F in 
the first row of the table 5 stands for funding type.  
 
From all the funding variables, only the FFOs are statistically significant. The 
positive coefficient of the FFOs is consistent with the notion that the FFOs are 
part of expansion funds available and the more funds a firm has, the easier is to 
expand. On the other hand, the statistically significance and of FFOs supports 
the POT in the sense that during expansion, firms tend to use internal funds 
before looking for alternatives. Although debt and leverage are statistically 
insignificant, their coefficients are consistent with prior empirical studies that 
illustrate that debt increases values of firms. The small coefficient and 
statistically insignificance of debt has to do with the fact that when firms take on 
debt especially large amounts, financiers issue stringent conditions on debt 
issuance. That is, those conditions minimises the impact of debt on options 
values. Parallel to exploring fund effect, the second hypothesis tested whether 
the way the M&A deal is financed (i.e. cash or stocks financed) matters. The 
results produced -0.1793 with a p-value of 0.2614. Thus, financing method type 
does not have any effect on options values. This could be due to the fact that 
most M&A deals were executed during the bull phase; therefore, it easier to 
finance M&A deals during the bull market phase. The F-statistics illustrate that 
there are structural breaks in funding 3, 4 and 5; however, one cannot do 
anything about them given that the analysis is based on cross sectional data. 
Table 6 illustrates growth effects on options values: 
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Table 6: Option Value Determinants: Growth 
Effect Variable G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 
G
ro
w
th
 
Constant 
0.6805** 
(0.0320) 
0.9975*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9971*** 
(0.0000) 
1.1744*** 
(0.0000) 
1.1453*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8273 
(0.1465) 
ac_audit_f 
0.0253 
(0.2689)     
0.0268 
(0.4526) 
ac_ROE 
 
0.6850 
(0.2336)    
0.0268 
(0.4526) 
ac_volp 
  
0.0017*** 
(0.0012)   
0.0021** 
(0.0348) 
growth 
   
-0.2976 
(0.1016)  
-0.2677 
(0.2645) 
rat_inv 
    
-0.1291 
(0.5344) 
-0.2339 
(0.3217) 
Adjusted R2 -0.75% 0.62% 2.19% 1.86% -0.89% 2.44% 
White Test 
0.7671 
(0.3811) 
0.0001 
(0.9908) 
0.9584 
(0.3276) 
0.2872 
(0.5920) 
0.8965 
(0.3437) 
2.5574 
(0.7678) 
Durbin-Watson 1.64 1.89 1.87 1.96 1.38 1.64 
F-Stat 
0.4419 
(0.5083) 
1.6220 
(0.2058) 
2.2132* 
(0.0761) 
2.8720* 
(0.0933) 
0.3558 
(0.5527) 
1.4637 
(0.2152) 
Akaike IC 2.56 2.52 2.51 2.51 2.65 2.67 
Schwartz IC 2.62 2.57 2.56 2.56 2.71 2.87 
Hannan-Quinn IC 2.59 2.54 2.53 2.53 2.67 2.64 
Note: Each model maps logarithm of option price against independent variable(s), for each model, the first number is the 
co-efficient of independent variable followed by p-value, ***, ** and * denote alphas at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; ac 
and ta are for acquiring and target firms respectively, growth is during the 1990s when there marathon growth of REITs, 
audit_f is for auditing fees, rat_inv is for investment grade rating and it is best case, and out of 106 M&A deals, 49 are 
rated as investment, 27 speculative and 30 have no ratings. We didn’t include speculative grade is it is the opposite 
investment grade, volp is volatility for a given asset. White test is for heteroscedasticity and durbin-watson for 
autocorrelation. For white test, the first numbers is the co-efficient followed by p-value and, akaike, schwarz and hannan-
quinn criteria compares models in relative terms. The G in the first row of the table 6 stands for growth. 
 
In table 6, the volatility is statistically significant with a positive coefficient. The 
reason why volatility is positive it is because volatility represents risk and 
investors want to be compensated for investing in risky investments. Amenc et 
al. (2012) found similar results on returns in relation to risks. On the other hand, 
the impact of acquirer volatility on options is consistent with the OPT. The 
reason why growth does not have an impact on options is that during the growth 
phase, investors tend to invest directly in underlying assets, thereby leading to 
fewer investments in options. He et al. (2010) illustrated that growth stocks 
react positive to new information (especially when the information positive) 
within trading environment, especially traders. Volatilities of target firms were 
left out as there is limited data on them. Dividends are left out because they are 
highly correlated with volatilities and audit fess of acquiring firms. The F-
statistics illustrate that there are structural breaks in growth 3 and 4; however, 
there is nothing one can do about it given that this analysis is based on cross 
sectional data. The last independent category that is examined is specialisation. 
For the specialisation categories, there is dummy 1 when there is that specific 
sector or fund type and 0 otherwise. For specialisation analysis, single-tenants, 
hotels and health care REITs are excluded because their inclusion causes 
multicollinearity. On the other hand, some acquiring and target REIT firms are 
correlated; therefore, most on the analysis for the specialisation category is on 
target firms. This is due to the fact that most of M&A intensity is mainly target 
firms. Parallel to testing for specialisation effect, this hypothesis tested whether 
most M&A options are within sectors or not. The within sectors coefficient for the 
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latter statement is -0.0058 with a p-value of 0.0005. Thus, options values which 
are within sectors decrease overall value firms. It could due to the fact that most 
of the U.S. REITs are specialised. Outside sectors have limited benefits as it 
costly to be a diversified REIT firm in the U.S. Table 7 illustrates results of 
specialisation: 
 
Table 7: Option Value Determinants: Specialisation 
Effect Variable S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
S
p
e
ci
a
li
sa
ti
o
n
 
constant 
0.9347*** 
(0.0000) 
1.3531*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0635*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6933*** 
(0.0000) 
0.7133*** 
(0.0000) 
0.7076*** 
(0.0000) 
ac_REOC 
0.3851* 
(0.0907)      
ac_nonre 
0.2507 
(0.2353)      
ac_div 
 
-0.3477* 
(0.0603)     
ac_ind 
 
-0.6080*** 
(0.0051)     
ac_mf 
 
-0.1837 
(0.1689)     
ac_sc 
 
0.1671 
(0.4711)    
0.1287 
(0.7972) 
ac_off 
 
-0.1693 
(0.5335)     
ta_REOC 
  
-0.2759 
(0.3545)  
-0.2012 
(0.5501) 
-0.1889 
(0.5766) 
ta_nonre 
  
0.1629 
(0.6069)   
0.0589 
(0.8630) 
ta_div 
   
0.3483** 
(0.0358) 
0.3444** 
(0.0402) 
0.3389* 
(0.0524) 
ta_ind 
   
-0.2568 
(0.2350) 
-0.2744 
(0.2147) 
-0.2775 
(0.2053) 
ta_mf 
   
-0.2891** 
(0.0178) 
-0.3062** 
(0.0175) 
-0.2922** 
(0.0216) 
ta_sc 
   
0.2722 
(0.2540) 
0.2542 
(0.2959) 
0.1384 
(0.7938) 
ta_off 
   
0.3633 
(0.1591) 
0.3454 
(0.1878) 
0.3499 
(0.1909) 
Adjusted R2 4.94% 2.61% 1.10% 1.73% 0.95% -1.06% 
White Test 
1.0058 
(0.6048) 
3.8825 
(0.5664) 
1.1773 
(0.5551) 
4.4987 
(0.4801) 
4.6684 
(0.5870) 
4.8616 
(0.6768) 
Durbin-Watson 2.14 1.87 1.85 1.90 1.90 1.91 
F-Stat 
3.4182** 
(0.0370) 
1.5310 
(0.1876) 
0.4611 
(0.6320) 
1.3489 
(0.2508) 
1.1584 
(0.3354) 
0.8698 
(0.5450) 
Akaike IC 2.51 2.54 2.55 2.55 5.56 2.61 
Schwartz IC 2.59 2.70 2.63 2.71 2.75 2.84 
Hannan-Quinn IC 2.54 2.60 2.58 2.61 2.64 2.70 
Note: Each model maps logarithm of option price against independent variable(s), for each model, the first number is the co-efficient of 
independent variable followed by p-value, ***, ** and * denote alphas at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; ac and ta are for acquiring and 
target firms respectively, SC is for shopping centres and includes shopping centres, regional malls and outlet centres sectors, off is for 
office, ind is for industrial and includes industrial and self-storage sectors, div is for diversified, mf is multi-family and includes multi-
family, residential homebuilder and manufactured home. Given some variables such as REITs sectors and traits are identified by 
dummies, when some groups were put together in one model, econometrical the model didn’t work as some of those parameters are 
explained by combination of some other parameters, i.e., multicollinearity, white test is for heteroscedasticity and durbin-watson for 
autocorrelation. For white test, the first numbers is the co-efficient followed by p-value and, akaike, schwarz and hannan-quinn criteria 
compares models in relative terms. Out of 106 M&A deals, 66 are within sectors and 40 outside sectors and we tested whether options 
values that are within sectors matter or not, results illustrated a co-efficient of -0.0058 with a p-value of 0.0005. The S in the first row of 
the table 7 stands for specialisation. 
 
For the acquirers, diversified and industrial sectors are statistically significant 
with negative coefficients. This is due to the fact that being diversified is the best 
case scenario in terms of specialisation while industrial sector is expensive one. 
Anderson et al. (2009) stated that in the U.S. most REITs are specialised as 
expertise within sectors may lead to a more proficient management and 
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reduction of costs. On the industrial sector, it provides specialised services and 
finances its operations with most of its retained earnings. Gibson and Lizieri 
(1999) stated that industrial REIT leases are rigid given that they are suitable 
for long-term horizons. For the target firms, coefficients of diversified and multi-
family are positive and negative respectively, and statistically significant. The 
diversification issue is relevant because target firms are likely to be 
overcompensated in mergers as it is costly to be diversified. The reason for 
negative and statistically significant multi-family coefficient might be due to the 
fact that multi-family sector has the highest cost-to-income ratio. On the other 
hand, Harrison et al. (2011) stated that leases of multi-family sectors are risky, 
and if the risks are not properly mitigated, one stands a chance of losing income 
of leases of multi-family sector. The F-statistics illustrate that specialisation 1 
has structural breaks; however, there is nothing one can do about it given that 
this analysis is based on cross sectional data. Table 8 reports three versions full 
models when the four aggregated factors driving M&A options are put together: 
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Table 8: Option Value Determinants: All Factors 
Effect Variable A1 A2 A3 
 
constant 
-0.4383 
(0.3952) 
-0.6920 
(0.7202) 
-0.57222 
(0.4518) 
Conflict of 
Interest 
ac_insider 
0.0273** 
(0.0145) 
0.0243* 
(0.0594) 
0.0298* 
(0.0861) 
ac_instit 
0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0002** 
(0.0281) 
ac_sboard 
-0.4155* 
(0.0519) 
-0.4254** 
(0.0479)  
Funding 
debt 
0.0065 
(0.9629) 
0.0149 
(0.7785) 
0.0046 
(0.9514) 
FFOs 
0.2145** 
(0.0203) 
0.1978* 
(0.0725) 
0.1856* 
(0.0792) 
Growth 
growth 
 
-0.1660 
(0.5478) 
-0.0016 
(0.9959) 
ac_audit_f 
 
0.0331 
(0.7966)  
ac_volp 
  
0.0019** 
(0.0018) 
rat_spec 
  
0.0089 
(0.9748) 
Specialisation 
ac_secsc 
  
0.2579 
(0.5727) 
ac_nonre 
  
0.2534 
(0.5967) 
ta_nonre 
  
0.2680 
(0.6202) 
ta_secoff 
  
0.1382 
(0.7034) 
Adjusted R2 18.20% 15.70% 22.03% 
White Test 
18.4416 
(0.4931) 
33.0444 
(0.4651) 
11.2588 
(0.4218) 
Durbin-Watson 1.52 1.54 1.49 
F-Stat 
3.4033** 
(0.0102) 
2.4366** 
(0.0324) 
3.3103** 
(0.0264) 
Akaike IC 2.45 2.51 2.52 
Schwartz IC 2.67 2.80 2.97 
Hannan-Quinn IC 2.54 2.62 2.70 
Note: Each model maps logarithm of option price against independent variable(s), for each model, the first number is the 
co-efficient of independent variable followed by p-value, ***, ** and * denote alphas at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; ac 
and ta are for acquiring and target firms respectively, beta is the risk, instit is for institutional holding, sboard is for 
staggered board, insider is for insider shareholding, FFOs are funds from operations (i.e. internal funds in this case), debt 
is calculating as sum of stocks, cash, preference shares and common operating units all over total funds and that ratio is 
subtracted from one, growth is during the 1990s when there was marathon growth of REITs, audit_f is for auditing fees, 
volp is volatility for a given asset, rat_spec is speculative grade rating and it is made up of the following ratings; BB+, BB, 
B+ and B. This article didn’t include investment grade as it is the opposite speculative grade, SC is for shopping centres 
and includes shopping centres, regional malls and outlet centres sectors, nonre is for non-real estate firm and off is for 
office. Given some variables such as REITs sectors and traits are identified by dummies, when some groups were put 
together in one model, econometrical the model didn’t work as some of those parameters are explained by combination of 
some other parameters, i.e., multicollinearity. White test is for heteroscedasticity and durbin-watson for autocorrelation. 
For white test, the first numbers is the co-efficient followed by p-value. When conflict 6 and funding 4 are put together, 
ac_beta and debt change to opposite signs from their initial signs in their respective groups due to multicollinearity; 
therefore, in combine 1 ac_beta and debt are excluded. When conflict 6, funding 4 and growth 6 are combined, debt and 
volp maintain their respective signs but change their statistical significance levels. Initial signs before ac_beta and 
audit_f coefficients change, in addition, ac_beta is highly correlated to ac_instit, ac_insider, ac_audit_f (audit fees) and 
growth while ac_audit_f is highly correlated to ac_beta, and growth, rat_spec and ac_volp are highly correlated with 
funding variables; therefore, ac_beta, ac_ROE, ac__volp and rat_spec are left out in combine 2. When conflict 6, funding 4, 
growth 6 and specialisation 7 are combined, the following parameters change their original signs; ac_beta, ac_audit_f, 
ac_secsc (SC is for shopping centres) and ta_secind (ind is for industrial), and the following parameters change their 
original statistical significance; ac_sboard (staggered board), debt, ac_volp, ta_secdiv (div is for diversified sector) and 
ta_secsc. Therefore, parameters that are inconsistent with their original results were left out. Moreover, excluded 
variables (i.e. ac_sboard and ac_audit_f in combine 3) were highly correlated with other variables. The following 
combinations; conflict 6 and growth 6, conflict 6 and specialisation 7, and conflict 6, funding 4 and specialisation 7, the 
three stated combinations yielded mixed-bag type of results. Akaike, schwarz and hannan-quinn show that models 
improve in relative terms. F-stats illustrate that combine 1, 2 and 3 do not fit well together; this might be due to grouping 
of limited data of different systematic components. The A in the first row of the table 7 stands for amalgamated. 
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All combine equations are consistent and show that the cross sectional 
explanatory power ranges between 15.70% and 22.03%. Combine 1 includes 
conflicts of interest and funding variables, combine 2 includes conflicts of 
interest, funding and growth variables and combine 3 includes conflicts of 
interest, funding, growth and specialisation variables. The positive and negative 
coefficients and statistical significance as for the same reasons mentioned earlier 
when specific effects where explored. When conflict 6 and funding 4 are put 
together, ac_beta and debt change to opposite signs from their initial signs in 
their respective groups due to multicollinearity; therefore, in combine 1, ac_beta 
and debt are excluded. When conflict 6, funding 4 and growth 6 are combined, 
debt and volp maintain their respective signs but change their statistical 
significance while ac_beta and audit_f (audit fees) change their initial signs 
before their coefficients. In addition, ac_beta is highly correlated to ac_instit, 
ac_instit, ac_audit_f and growth while ac_audit_f is highly correlated with 
ac_beta. Growth, rat_spec and ac_volp (acquirer volatility) are highly correlated 
with funding variables; therefore, ac_beta, ac_ROE, ac_volp and rat_spec in 
combine 2 are left out. 
 
When conflict 6, funding 4, growth 6 and specialisation 7 are combined, the 
following parameters change their original signs; ac_beta, ac_audit_f, ac_secsc 
(SC is for shopping centres) and ta_secind (Secind is for industrial sector). The 
following parameters change their original statistical significance levels; 
ac_sboard (staggered board), debt, ac_volp, ta_secdiv (div is for diversified) and 
ta_secsc. Therefore, parameters that are inconsistent with their original results 
are left out. Moreover, excluded variables (i.e. ac_sboard and ac_audit_f in 
combine 3) were highly correlated with other variables. The combinations of 
conflict 6 and growth 6, conflict 6 and specialisation 7, and conflict 6, funding 4 
and specialisation 7 yield mixed-bag results. The F-statistics show structural 
breaks in combine 1, 2 and 3; however, there is nothing one can do given that the 
analyses are based on cross sectional data. Growth and specialisation effects in 
combine models seem to affect options values less than the conflicts of interest 
and funding effects. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Firstly, when one compares the full sample, only cash-financed merger generated 
9.4% average returns while deals financed through a combination of cash and 
stocks generate 10% average loss. Secondly, due to the emerging exchange 
options, liquidity in the REIT industry increases and more information spillovers 
to stakeholders in the REIT industry. Furthermore, it is illustrated that some 
REIT characteristics contribute to options values during mergers. Fourth, the 
overall results are in line with the previous studies that analysed abnormal 
returns, which are not exclusive to studies on the REIT industry. On the other 
hand, the impact of variables on emerging exchange options is consistent with 
POT and OPT. Fifth, despite the fact that some models have negative adjusted 
R2, the adjusted R2 for the combined models show a significant improvement as 
models are rolled over. Hartzell et al. (2005) stated that low adjusted R2 are 
common in the real estate industry because of its nature. 
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The implications of this study are important. Firstly, when REIT firms merge, 
stakeholders will have better insights in REIT mergers if they price those M&A 
deals using option pricing techniques. Therefore, option pricing techniques 
illustrated more insights than traditional valuation techniques such as the 
DCFs. Secondly, for accurate pricing and hedging, one can infer from betas that 
in certain cases it is costly and other times it is cheap as illustrated by high and 
low betas respectively. Thirdly, some REIT traits (i.e. conflicts of interest, 
internal funds and market risk) have a high explanatory power than others in 
mergers. Finally, zero options values suggest that REIT mergers might be driven 
by strategic objectives as opposed to financial gains. Fifth, the statistical 
measures in the REIT industry tend to have counter-intuitive reasoning when 
compared with other capital markets. 
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